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The claim, typically ascribed1 to David Hume2, that no ‘ought’ can be de-
rived from an ‘is’, has given rise to one of the most significant debates of 
contemporary Christian ethics. Lack of resolution has left the field at an im-
passe, with scholars divided along the fact-value parallel over fundamental 
questions of moral epistemology and the ontological foundations of ethics3. 
Does the logical distinction of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ imply a radical dichotomy bet-
ween the natural order and the existential?4 In what sense do moral principles 
                                                                            
1  As Robert George notes, In Defense of Natural Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), 28 n. 2, Finnis 
maintains that Hume was not the first one to acknowledge this distinction, but that it was 
affirmed by Aristotle. See Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (hereafter: NLNR) (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1980), 37 n. 43; Fundamentals of Ethics, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1983) 10-17, 20-23. 
That the Grisez School believes Aquinas to have held to this view as well is abundantly clear. 
See for example, Grisez, “The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the 
Summa Theologiae, 1-2 Question 94, Article 2” Natural Law Forum 10 (1965):168-201; and 
Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, Founders of Modern Political and Social 
Thought (Oxford: OUP, 1998), 86-90. 
2  See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. David Fate Norton & Nary J. Norton, 
Oxford Philosophical Texts, ed. John Cottingham (Oxford: OUP, 2000), Bk. 3, Pt. 1 §1 final 
paragraph (302). 
3  I have borrowed (I think) this felicitious metaphor from Rufus Black’s fine study, Christian 
Moral Realism: Natural Law, Narrative, Virtue and the Gospel (Oxford: OUP, 2000). 
4  Germain Grisez works from an ontology of four irreducible orders: the natural, or given order, 
which reason only considers; the logical, or intentional order, which reason introduces into its 
own acts, the existential order, by which reason guides human willing to realize possibilities, 
and the technological or cultural order which “reason by invention or planning or habits of 
using induces in or imposes upon what is in human power” Grisez draws this ontology from 
Book 1, Lecture 1 of St. Thomas Aquinas’ commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 
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originate in human nature, as Vatican II affirms?5 Is practical understanding 
dependent on prior factual knowledge of some sort, and if so, what sort and 
how? It is to these central questions that we turn out attention. 
Among the major contributors to this debate have been Germain Grisez 
and the various scholars with whom he has collaborated to develop what has 
frequently been called the “New Natural Law Theory”6. These thinkers have 
cogently argued that practical propositions cannot be derived from purely 
speculative premises. Nevertheless, common misconstruals notwithstanding, 
their position does not entail a divorce between the natural and the existential, 
or between speculative and practical knowledge. This latter point has been 
widely misunderstood or overlooked at the expense of the theory’s apparent 
plausibility and wider acceptance7. The purpose of this paper then, is to 
elucidate both the distinction and relation between practical and speculative 
knowledge as understood in the natural law theory articulated by the Grisez 
School. This aspect of their theory has not received sufficient attention from 
scholars, and I would even contend that it has perhaps not been developed in 
as much detail as one might wish8.  
                                                                            
(available in English translation by C.I. Litzinger, O.P., Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1993, 
pp.1-6). While Grisez does not fully develop this ontology anywhere to the best of my know-
ledge, it is introduced in his early article, “Sketch of a Future Metaphysics” The New Scholas-
tocism 38, no. 3 (1964): 310-340, and it is articulated most fully in Beyond the New Theism: A 
Philosophy of Religion (Notre Dame: UND Press, 1975), 230-40 (this book was re-released in 
2004 —I believe with identical page numbering— by St. Augustine’s Press under the title: 
God: A Philosophical Preface to Faith). 
5  See Dignitatis Humanae (DH) 14, to be discussed in more detail below (§1.1). 
6  This refers to the moral theory developed chiefly by Germain Grisez and John Finnis, with the 
extensive cooperation of Joseph Boyle and to a significant though lesser extent, William E. 
May. Other important contemporary exponents of this theory include: E. Christian Brugger, 
Robert George, Patrick Lee, Rev. Peter Ryan, S.J. and Russell Shaw.  
7  See Black, 5-11. 
8  The reason I think further development may be warranted is that a detailed discussion of the 
way in which non-practical knowledge figures in to understanding the first principles of prac-
tical reason in the Grisez School’s theory is almost entirely absent from discussions I have seen 
of that theory. This is notable given that much of the critical discussion surrounding the theory 
centers on the charge that it radically divorces speculative and practical reason. Moreover, the 
Grisez School’s response to those criticisms seems to have tended more in the direction of the 
material found in §1 and §2.16 of this brief paper, but not so much in the direction of that 
found in §2.3-7, 12-14. The ideas located in these latter sections are indeed found in the wri-
tings of the Grisez Scholars. See for example, Grisez, Christian Moral Principles (hereafter: 
CMP) vol. 1 of The Way of the Lord Jesus (Quincy, IL: Franciscan Herald, 1983), 195-96; 
NLNR 65; Aquinas, 94. To the best of my knowlege, Finnis thus far has addressed this issue in 
the greatest detail by specifying what the data of nonpractical awareness consist in. Questions 
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The thesis I will advance in this paper presupposes the proposition that no 
‘ought’ can be derived from an ‘is’ is true9. Nevertheless (and here is my 
thesis), I would like to make two central claims: First, moral norms have an 
ontological basis in human nature; second, knowledge of the first principles 
of practical reasoning indeed does presuppose some non-practical experiential 
understanding of reality-as-given (that is, some knowledge of facts). Both of 
these claims are consistent with the proposition that moral norms cannot be 
derived from only speculative premises, even though these claims may 
initially seem to contradict that proposition. The task of the remainder of this 
paper will be to explain my two central claims against the backdrop of an 
affirmation of the logical distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. To undertake 
this inquiry, let us first distinguish two important questions.  
Some, and perhaps much, resistance to the idea that there is a logical dis-
tinction between the ‘is’ of nature and the moral ‘ought’ stems from the con-
fusion of two distinct but closely related questions: first, whether ethics is 
grounded in human nature, and second, whether knowledge of practical truth 
is derived from speculative cognition of some sort10. The reason resistance 
arises is that a negative answer to the latter question would seem to entail a 
negative answer to the former. However, it does not. Notice that the first 
question is ontological, whereas the second is epistemic11. Natural law pre-
cepts can thus be considered with respect to their ontological foundations or 
with respect to the manner in which they are known. This crucial distinction 
shows that one may be able to affirm that practical reasoning does not 
methodologically presuppose speculative knowledge without being compe-
lled to deny that human naure somehow underlies and gives shape to practical 
truth and even to our coming to know the first principles of practical reason.  
Notice also that the second question—whether our knowledge of moral 
truth is derived from speculative cognition of some sort—itself raises two 
closely related questions: First, as to whether some other form of dependence 
                                                                            
not explicitly answered by the Grisez School include: are the “facts” presupposed by practical 
understanding propositional truths? Are they known reflectively?  
9  Besides the extensive treatment of this topic in the works of Finnis, Grisez and their collabo-
rators, see Black, 1-45 for a good discussion.  
10  See George, 85. 
11  Finnis and George repeatedly make the important point that “the order of ontological depen-
dence is in some respects [not omitted] the converse of the epistemological principle” (Aqui-
nas, 92, 102 z; see also Fundamentals of Ethics, 21-22). In other words, what comes first in the 
order of being typically comes last in the order of knowing, and vice versa. Failure to 
recognize this point seems to have contributed to the mistaken notion that practical knowledge 
must procede from a metaphysical account of human nature.  
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than logical might obtain, and second about what sort of cognition might be 
involved. Might the dependence in question be epistemological? Is the sort of 
cognition at issue speculative knowledge proper, or some other more basic 
type of factual knowledge or non-practical awareness? Before addressing 
these latter questions, let us first turn our attention to the former ontological 
question of whether ethics is grounded in human nature. 
 
2. Moral principles are ontologically grounded in human nature 
Vatican II’s Decree on Religious Liberty, Dignitatis humanae, affirms that 
the truths of the moral order originate in human nature when it teaches that 
the Catholic Church’s mission includes the duty to “declare and confirm by 
her authority, the principles of the moral order that flow forth [lit: “flowing 
forth” {profluentia}] from human nature itself”12.  
But if the moral order is not reducible to the order of nature, in what sense 
do moral principles originate from human nature? If the saying: “Here is your 
nature—now be what you are” has, as Grisez maintains, “a true sense”13, 
what is that sense?  
The answer is that human nature, by having the specific characteristics and 
potentials it has, points to and delimits all of the things that perfect it and that 
practical reason grasps as goods to be sought14. These perfections are basic 
                                                                            
12  DH 14. The actual quote in context reads: “For by the will of Christ, the Catholic Church, 
whose mission it is to announce and authentically teach the Truth which is Christ, and at the 
same time, by her authority, to declare and confirm the principles of the moral order flowing 
forth from human nature itself, is the teacher of truth” {Christi enim voluntate Ecclesia catho-
lica magistra est veritatis, eiusque munus est, ut Veritatem quae Christus est enuntiet atque 
authentice doceat, simulque principia ordinis moralis, ex ipsa natura humana profluentia, auc-
toritate sua declaret atque confirmet}. 
13  CMP 105. 
14  In other words, moral principles flow forth from human nature insofar as human nature, in 
terms of its capacities for fulfillment, is what we might call the “correlate” of that set of goods 
which specifies the first principle of practical reason. This correlation between aspects of hu-
man nature and the goods which fulfill it is evident from the Grisez School’s categorization of 
the various types of human good. While the first principles of practical reason are self-evi-
dently known and so are not derived from prior speculative knowledge of human nature, 
speculative reflection on human nature can nevertheless corroborate practical insight (by 
means of a ‘dialectical defense’ or ‘argument from the side’). For instance, as bodily, human 
persons are fulfilled by life and health. As rational, human persons are fulfilled by such goods 
as knowledge and aesthetic apprectiation. As both bodily and rational, human persons are 
makers and sharers in culture and so are fulfilled by play and skilled performance. These are 
called “substantive goods”—varities of human good which do not include choosing in their 
very definition. See Grisez, CMP, 124; Grisez, Joseph Boyle, & Finnis, “Practical Principles, 
Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends” American Journal of Jurisprudence 32 (1987): 107. Beyond 
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human goods precisely because of their ability to contribute to the flourishing 
of beings with a human nature15: The range of basic human goods is not 
determined by free choice; rather free choices are made among the goods 
toward which human persons are inclined by nature. The first principle of 
practical reason is, as it stands, general. It is specified in terms of the basic 
human goods (and their contraries), as for example, the proposition: “Know-
ledge of truth is a good to be preserved and promoted, and error, an evil to be 
avoided” specifies the more general: “Good is to be pursued and promoted 
and evil avoided.” While the primary principles of practical reason underlie 
both good and evil choices when taken individually, they possess an integral 
directiveness when taken collectively, in which moral norms have their ge-
nesis. In other words, human nature defines the range of basic human goods 
which serve as the differentiating content of the general determinants of the 
first principle of practical reason, and it is the integral directiveness of these 
general determinants in concert which generates moral normativity16. 
Thus, if human nature were different, human goods would be different; 
and if human goods were different, the practical principles commending their 
pursuit would be different; if these practical principles were different, their 
integral directiveness would be different; and if their integral directiveness 
were different, so too would be the content of morality. In short, if human 
nature were not what it is, the moral principles governing human choice and 
action would likewise be different. Therefore, the principles of the moral 
order find their ontological source in human nature17. 
                                                                            
that, as rational and free, human persons can act through deliberation and choice, thereby 
fostering various forms of harmony both within themselves and with others. They are thus 
fulfilled by various goods that include choosing in their very definition, such as: friendship and 
common life, harmony with God, and various types of personal integrity (including the 
harmony of one’s emotions among themselves and with one’s judgments and choices, and also 
including harmony between one’s “judgments, choices and performances” or, “peace of 
conscience”). These are called ‘reflexive goods.’ See “Practical Principles,” 107-8.  
15  Indeed, the Grisez School insists that basic human goods are aspects of human persons 
inasmuch as they are constituents of those persons’ fulfillment (see for example, CMP 121-22; 
NLNR, 371-72). Thus it is a mistake to understand human goods as abstract objects apart from 
the human person as Russell Hittinger does in his seminal (if somewhat uncareful): A Critique 
of the New Natural Law Theory (Notre Dame: UND Press, 1987), 29-30. George replies to this 
point of criticism, 66-68. 
16  The whole complex of human goods, taken together in the community of human persons, 
constitutes integral human fulfillment (for more on this point, see Grisez, CMP, 185). Human 
nature thereby gives shape to moral principles by delineating the content of integral human 
fulfillment. 
17  See George, 86-87. 
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3. The role of experience in coming to know the precepts of the natural 
law 
We have just seen that human nature defines the range of things that are 
fulfilling and that practical reason recognizes as to-be-sought in human 
choice and activity. But what role does human nature play in one’s grasp of 
the basic principles of practical reasoning? The argument developed by 
Aquinas and maintained by the Grisez School is that the basic precepts of the 
natural law are self-evidently known and as such, indemonstrable18. The in-
tegral role human nature plays in one’s grasp of practical principles explains 
the sense in which they are self-evident.  
To claim that the primary principles of practical reason are self-evident is 
to say that basic human goods are known as such by nature and not by 
reflection upon or derivation from prior speculative knowledge about human 
nature or anything else. In other words, we immediately grasp something as a 
good to be pursued and promoted by a non-inferential insight precisely in 
being the kind of beings we are—by experiencing human nature from the 
inside, and not by theorizing about it.  
This point about experience is crucial: to assert that the primary principles 
of practical reason are per se nota is not tantamount to maintaining that they 
are intuitions, a-priori forms or intellectual structures, insights without data, 
or some other kind of innate knowledge19. While our natural inclinations are 
innate, knowledge of their respective objects as goods to be pursued by 
human activity is not. Rather, practical knowledge of basic human goods 
presupposes the data of sense experience: a certain non-practical awareness 
of facts that one naturally and unreflectively comes to have in experiencing 
one’s natural inclinations and their satisfaction. But what exactly are these 
non-practical data? How does sense experience form the basis of a practical 
insight? 
                                                                            
18  See S.t. 1-2 q. 94 a. 2. On this point, besides the works previously cited, see Finnis’s essay: 
“Natural Inclinations and Natural Rights: Deriving ‘Ought’ form ‘Is’ According to Aquinas” in 
L. J. Elders and K. Hedwig, eds. Lex et Libertas, Studi Tomistici 30 (Vatican City: Pontifica 
Accademia di S. Tommaso, 1987) ??? [locate this source!]. 
19  The Grisez School has repeatedly asserted this point. See for example, George, 64. 
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An example with respect to one of the basic human goods may shed light 
on an answer to these questions20. Let us consider the good of play and 
skillful performance.  
Young children express the innate tendency toward skillful play and natu-
rally come to develop certain skills in the course of playing. For instance, 
instinctively21 playing with a puzzle, a little girl develops the ability to fit 
complementary pieces together to form a coherent picture. She is quite 
naturally delighted when she is able to find and connect the matching pieces, 
and she becomes quite vexed when she cannot. Thus, the little girl experien-
ces both the inclination to perform skillfully and fulfillment in the object of 
that inclination.  
Through this experience and the memory22 of many others like it, the little 
girl soon comes to know at least three things quite spontaneously and unre-
flectively23. First, she grasps what play and skillful performance are—the 
perfections that satisfy her innate tendency. A basic grasp of what these 
objects are is presupposed by the understanding that they are objects of value. 
Second, she comes to understand by experience—particularly repeated expe-
rience and personal interaction—that skillful play is a possibility that can be 
further realized by her and others24. Recognition of possibility is necessary 
for knowing anything as to-be-done. Third, the little girl also comes to grasp 
the connection between what she does and her fulfillment in or by doing it. 
Thus, she comes to understand her ability to achieve satisfaction through acti-
vity—an essential piece of data for understanding an object as an end, as 
worthy of pursuit25. 
                                                                            
20  See CMP, 196 for a parallel example of a child’s coming to grasp knowledge as a good to be 
pursued. Finnis also uses knowledge as an example and my exposition directly parallels his. 
See Natural Law and Natural Rights, 65 and Aquinas, 88-89.  
21  Read: ‘spontaneously’. I do not intend here to make any statement one way or the other about 
the status of human instincts. ‘Spontaneously’ has been avoided for stylistic reasons.  
22  Importantly, Finnis notes the essential role of not only experience, but memory as well. See 
Aquinas, 88, n.131. 
23  See NLNR 65-66. 
24  See Finnis, Aquinas, 94. 
25  One may reasonably wonder how this connection between spontaneous activity and its 
outcome could be understood in experience. For it seems to be a cause-effect relationship, and 
cause-effect relationships are known in reasoning rather than by experience. However, a 
counterexample from the behavior of children under the age of reason shows that they clearly 
do grasp by experience the connection between their own activity and the bringing about of 
certain states of affairs: A toddler raises his arms into the air because he knows by experience 
that if he does so, Daddy will pick him up. At this point, I think this counterexample works. 
However I admit this is a difficult matter and requires further reflection than I can undertake at 
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Thus, certain data learned in experience are presupposed in the intellect’s 
grasp of basic practical principles. Abstracting from the above example, these 
data are: (1) a grasp of the content of the object of pursuit, content upon 
which value supervenes and which practical reason will immediately un-
derstand as good or bad (e.g. the realization of what what play is); (2) a grasp 
of the possibility of pursuing the object (e.g. the realization that one can 
play); and (3) a grasp of the connection between activity and fulfillment (e.g. 
the realization that engaging in play results in satisfaction).  
It is essential to notice that while experience provides the necessary data 
for a practical insight, the practical insight is nevertheless not inferred from 
these non-practical data. One does not reason: ‘play and skillful performance 
are goods to be pursued because they would fulfill my innate tendencies or 
give me a feeling of satisfaction,’ or ‘because they are a possibility I could 
realize, etc.  
In coming to the insight that “skillful play is a good is to be pursued and 
promoted” there is no ‘because,’ for there is no middle term explaining the 
connection between the subject and the predicate of that proposition. Rather, 
the practical intellect at once recognizes that the predicate is included in the 
intelligibility of the subject by virtue of an understanding of both predicate 
and subject—that is, by virtue of knowledge of the proposition’s constituent 
terms26. These constituent terms are understood through the repeated expe-
rience of one’s natural tendencies and the activity of memory. Since it is im-
possible to understand a proposition without understanding the terms that 
comprise it, and since the primary principles of practical reason are propo-
sitions, therefore, to grasp the truth of a primary principle of practical reason, 
one must comprehend the terms that comprise it. Because the primary prin-
ciples of practical reason are self-evident, once their terms are understood, 
their truth is immediately grasped by a basic insight which constitutes an 
irreducible starting point for practical reasoning27. 
                                                                            
present. In any case, even if reasoning were presupposed, it would still be the case that 
practical insights are not logically derived from antecedent speculative knowledge, and this is 
the most important point.  
26  See Finnis, Aquinas, 88. 
27  Furthermore, the self-evidence of these principles does not mean that they cannot be mea-
ningfully denied. Their self-evidence is not an analytical self-evidence, such that their denial 
would be logically absurd. Rather, the rejection of any of these claims while comprehensible, 
would be unreasonable because in denying the truth of a primary principle of practical reason, 
one is denying an aspect of one’s own humanity. On a related note, self-evidence does not 
entail that everyone actually knows all of the primary principles of practical reason (on error 
with respect to first practical principles, see Finnis, Aquinas, 100-01 u; George, 62-63). As St. 
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Moreover, to the extent that the non-practical data upon which practical 
understanding depends comprise the terms of the practical principle, insight 
into first practical principles cannot be the result of a reasoning process from 
the non-practical data because these data are not themselves propositional (a 
point I shall revisit momentarily). Since the data presupposed by practical 
understanding are not propositional, they do not constitute premises from 
which a conclusion may be derived.  
On another note, it is also important to recognize that while insight into 
the satisfaction of one’s natural inclinations is part of the data necessary for 
grasping the primary principles of practical reason (datum 3 above), it is not 
the case that one’s desires, strictly speaking, determine what is good28. 
Volition follows apprehension, and human wants follow upon the practical 
insights that suppose one’s innate tendencies and the natural emotional 
responses one has to their fulfillment29. Therefore, it invites confusion, I 
                                                                            
Thomas explains, a proposition can be objectively or subjectively self-evident (S.t. 1-2 q. 94 a. 
2 c.). For a proposition to be objectively self-evident, all that is required is for the predicate to 
be included in the intelligibility of the subject. To be subjectively self-evident however, one 
must know the meaning of the proposition’s terms, so that one can recognize the relation 
between subject and predicate. While the primary principles of practical reason are naturally 
known, one who does not grasp the terms of the principle is not in a position to know the 
principle itself. While normally such requisite knowledge is naturally or spontaneously recei-
ved through experience, cultural or domestic environments which repress one or another aspect 
of human flourishing create an atmosphere inimical to the full experience of one’s natural 
inclinations. This can perhaps be most clearly seen with respect to the good of harmony with 
God. In a secular or atheistic household, for instance, a child may not come to grasp the 
concept of God, or experience the fulfillment that comes from seeking harmony with him in 
worship. Perhaps the child’s natural curiosity leads her to questions about God which are 
squelched by her parents through either ignorance or bad-will.  
 This leads to an important point about the relationship between speculative and practical 
reasoning: it seems to me it might be possible that speculative knowledge could be 
presupposed in coming to grasp a primary principle of practical reason, as for instance in the 
case of a person who, honestly pursuing the good of knowledge, concludes by a reasoning 
process that there is a God. I think this conclusion might awaken his natural tendency for 
harmony with God and lead to the insight that that is a good to be pursued. Nevertheless, this 
insight is not inferred from the data (this point parallels the discussion in n. 23, above). 
 I can however think of a potential rejoinder to this line of thought: What motivates the quest 
for knowledge to turn in the direction of an inquiry about the existence of God if not a prior 
grasp that, if there were a God, it would be good to be in harmony with him? Insight into the 
goodness of potential harmony with the divine might then lead one to the conclusion that one 
ought to try determine whether he exists. I am not able to pursue this train of thought now, but 
I think it warrants further reflection in the future.  
28  See Finnis, Aquinas, 59-60, 89-90, 95 c; Fundamentals of Ethics 26-37. 
29  I have discussed this point more thoroughly in a paper given to the Systematic Theology Se-
minar at the University of St. Andrews (11/22/06) titled: “Desire and Apprehension of the 
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think, to refer to one’s natural inclinations as desires, because strictly spea-
king, they the pre-rational tendencies which underlie the insights from which 
desire springs. Thinking of them as desires can quickly lead to the confusion 
that what is humanly fulfilling is a factor of human volition rather than the 
other way round. Conversely, as rational creatures, we come to desire some-
thing by first understanding its goodness.  
Shifting gears, by this stage of our inquiry, one surely wonders: Are the 
non-practical data grasped in sense experience actually a form of speculative 
knowledge?  
To reply: If so, they are certainly not speculative knowledge in the ordi-
nary sense (what I shall call ‘speculative knowledge proper’), for speculative 
knowledge as ordinarily conceived is propositional and reflexive30. It is arri-
ved at by a process of inquiry or discursive reasoning (theorizing or specu-
lation) whereby the mind apprehends that it understands being. In contrast, 
the primitive non-practical awareness to which I am referring which one has 
of certain basic facts through sense experience is non-reflective and pre-
propositional. It is this initial purchase on (grasp of) reality that the specu-
lative intellect objectifies and expresses in propositional form31. Indeed, sense 
cognition supplies the data required for the understanding and formulation of 
both speculative and practical propositions, and is thereby presupposed by 
both kinds of knowledge, speculative and practical.  
Still, just to the extent that this primitive experiential knowledge is of 
reality-as-given, it is therefore non-practical and may appropriately be called 
‘speculative’ or ‘theoretical’ in a restricted sense. Finnis himself explicitly 
speaks at least twice of the “theoretical knowledge” that practical understan-
ding “presupposes” and elsewhere speaks of these data as ‘facts’32. Grisez 
likewise refers to the “factual truths which provide a background for...prac-
tical insight” but unlike Finnis, he avoids calling this “nonpractical aware-
                                                                            
Good: The Interpenetration of Intellect and Appetite with respect to Knowing First Principles 
of Practical Reason (a Perspective Based on Texts from Aquinas’s Summa theologiae).  
30  In saying that speculative knowledge proper is propositional and reflexive, the product of a dis-
cursive process of inquiry, I do not of course mean to suggest that all propositional knowledge 
is arrived at by a process of reflection or discourse. First principles (practical or speculative) 
are propositions, and insofar as these are self-evident, they are non-inferentially known.  
31  For a helpful treatment of Grisez’s view of human cognition, see CMP 64-65. 
32  See Finnis, Aquinas, 94. 
Ontological and epistemological foundations of practical understanding 155 
 
ness” ‘speculative’ or ‘theoretical’33. In my estimation, while it is important 
to acknowledge that a grasp of reality-as-given is presupposed by practical 
understanding, it is also important to anticipate the confusion that calling such 
non-practical knowledge ‘theoretical’ (or for that matter, ‘factual’ or 
‘speculative’) might engender. Indeed, the use of such terms might seem to 
suggest the very claim the Grisez School so ardently denies: that practical 
understanding rests upon speculative knowledge proper. For this reason, 
although I have made limited use of the terms ‘fact’ and ‘factual’, I have 
avoided the use of other terms like ‘theoretical’ or ‘speculative’ in favor of 
expressions like ‘non-practical’ to describe the primitive knowledge of given 
reality presupposed by practical understanding. Still, Finnis’s use of the term 
‘theoretical knowledge’ in this context, as well the use of ‘fact’ by both 
Finnis and Grisez is interesting, and shows that careful and explained use of 
such language may be warranted. I would even like to suggest that such 
disciplined usage may be germane to a rapprochement between natural law 
theorists divided by misconceptions surrounding the fact-value distinction. 
It is difficult to think about experiential knowledge as distinct from spe-
culative knowledge proper because that very exercise is itself an act of the 
speculative intellect reflecting back upon experience, and presenting the con-
tent of its reflection in propositional form. So it is easy to confuse experien-
tial knowing with knowing experiential knowing—that is, with speculative 
knowledge—because the self as first-knowing can seem transparent. I suspect 
this confusion is what has led, at least in part, to the denial of the claim that a 
grasp of natural law precepts does not methodologically suppose prior specu-
lative knowledge.  
Another contributing factor to that denial is, I suspect, a confusion of the 
ways primitive non-practical awareness contributes to practical understan-
ding, and speculative knowledge proper contributes to practical reasoning. 
The claim that the understanding of practical principles does not rest on prior 
speculative knowledge is not tantamount to the position that speculative 
knowledge does not contribute to practical reasoning34—often in a decisive 
way by enhancing one’s understanding of human goods or by supplying cru-
cial information about what Robert George calls “ranges of emperical possi-
                                                                            
33  CMP 196. In personal (informal) correspondence (10/31/06), Grisez, not adverting to the work 
of Finnis, has indicated he thinks it would be misleading to refer to the data of sense 
experience as a form of theoretical knowledge. 
34  My point here turns on the distinction between understanding and reasoning. A further explo-
ration of this distinction as it arises in the S.t. is found in “Desire and Apprehension of the 
Good” (n. 27, above). 
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bility and environmental constraint”35. It is routinely impossible to form a 
judgment about whether something should be pursued or avoided without the 
contribution of speculative knowledge deepening one’s understanding of 
oneself, the conditions of the world, and/or what belongs to the content of a 
basic human good. One does grasp that health, for instance, is a good to be 
pursued and promoted without the contribution of speculative knowledge 
proper, but one cannot concretely pursue and promote health without specu-
lative knowledge of, for example, the fact that this medication will have these 
effects on those particular tissues and organs, etc. Still, one’s practical 
judgments about health are not inferred from speculative knowledge about 
physics, chemistry or biology36. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the claim that no ‘ought’ can be derived from an ‘is’ holds 
true. It is impossible to validly move from only factual premises to a nor-
mative conclusion without appealing to a basic practical principle to ground 
or explain that conclusion. This distinction however, does not amount to a 
dichotomy between ‘is’ and ‘ought.’ The principles of the moral order origi-
nate in human nature insofar as human nature defines the parameters of what 
is fulfilling for human persons. Furthermore, through experiencing one’s 
nature, one comes to grasp by a non-inferential insight, the practical princi-
ples whose integral directiveness leads one to human fulfillment. The non-
practical awareness of factual data one grasps in experience and which 
ground such an insight is distinct from and more basic than speculative 
knowledge as ordinarily understood. Nevertheless, while the understanding of 
practical principles does not presuppose speculative knowledge proper, 
speculative knowledge proper does contribute to practical reasoning in signi-
ficant ways by supplying content crucial for adequate deliberation37. 
                                                                            
35  See George, 63-65, 73-74, 89 (quote). 
36  See George, 64. 
37  I would like to express my deep gratitude to Fr. Peter Ryan, S.J. for taking the time to read an 
earlier draft of this paper and provide extensive feedback. His comments both deepened my 
reflection on the topic and helped to articulate things more clearly at several points. The views 
set forth in this paper, as well as the manner of expression, should not be taken as necessarily 
indicative of his own (Fr. Ryan expressed reservations for example, about my use of the term 
‘fact’ to describe the data of experience presupposed by practical understanding). Of course, I 
take full responsibility for any errors—interpretive or otherwise—contained herein.  
